Academic patent value and knowledge transfer in the UK. Does patent ownership matter? by Sterzi, Valerio
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Academic patent value and knowledge
transfer in the UK. Does patent
ownership matter?
Valerio Sterzi
GREThA, Universite´ Bordeaux IV - CNRS, KITES, Bocconi
University
November 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34955/
MPRA Paper No. 34955, posted 23. November 2011 13:31 UTC
Academic patent value and knowledge transfer
in the UK. Does patent ownership matter?
Valerio Sterzi
GREThA, Université Bordeaux IV, CNRS & KITeS, Bocconi University
November 21, 2011
Abstract
This paper deals with an issue which is particularly relevant in the literature on IPR and university-
industry knowledge transfer: is the ownership structure of academic inventions relevant for patent
quality and the e¢ ciency of the knowledge transfer process? This question is also particularly
signicant in Europe where some countries have followed the Bayh-Dole Act example in the USA to
increase the involvement level of universities in IP management. The paper uses a novel dataset of
academic inventors in the UK, which includes university patents (i.e. patents owned by universities)
and corporate patents (i.e. patents signed by academic scientists but owned by private companies)
in the period 1990-2001. The UK is an interesting case to study due to the tradition of university
involvement in IP management as it was one of the rst countries to implement the university
ownership model.
The main results may be summarised as follows.
(1) Controlling for observable patent and scientist characteristics, corporate patents received more
citations than university patents in the rst three years after ling, but (2) this di¤erence is less
signicant when considering a longer time window. However, (3) there is no knowledge fertilisation
across public (university) and private institutions: university patents mainly cite other university
patents and the same reasoning applies to corporate patents. Moreover (4) knowledge ows from
university patents are even more geographically localised than those from corporate patents. Finally,
(5) among scientistscharacteristics, a professors scientic quality and his patenting experience seem
to be correlated with patent value.
From a policy prospective, the results in points (1), (2) and (3) cast some doubts on the role of
university ownership as an instrument to foster and facilitate knowledge transfer between academia
and industry and raise serious questions about the e¤ect of policies towards increasing the role of
technology transfer o¢ ces in managing academic patents.
1 Introduction
Knowledge produced by academic scientists has been identied as one of the most important channels
for technological progress and economic growth. Mainly through the transfer of knowledge, publicly
nanced science feeds and supports the private sectors, in turn, creating new jobs and generating
income (the so-called Third Stream Activity in the UK). The majority of industrial patents are based
on ndings generated within public research labs (Narin et al. (1997) show that 73 percent of papers
cited by US patents owned by the private sector are public in nature, being authored at academic,
governmental, and other public institutions). Thus, science policies have paid special attention for a
long time to the most e¢ cient tools for improving the exploitation of knowledge created in universities
and public research institutions. In particular, in Europe many governments followed the Bayh-Dole
Act example from the USA in order to increase the level of university involvement in the management
of the inventions produced by their sta¤ (see Geuna and Rossi (2011) for a description of the changes
in university IPR regulations in Europe, and Meyer and Tang (2007) for a UK policy context).
According to this view, academic scientists should contribute to the innovation activity not only by
broadening the science base, but also by producing (patentable) inventions suitable for industrial
application.
At the same time universities have been characterised by substantial changes in terms of research
funding and have been gradually obliged to diversify the sources of their nance. In many countries
public funds have signicantly declined (especially in the UK since the mid 1980s)1 and have been
to some extent substituted by competitive funds (Geuna, 2001).
Greater emphasis on IPR issues and the nancial straits of public research funds have gradually
changed the incentive structure for academic scientists and led them to face an increasing pressure to
patent. For this reason an important concern is related to the possible shift of researchersresources
toward more applied research and the patenting of lower quality inventions (Henderson et al., 1998,
Mowery et al., 2002). Thus, many scholars have dealt with patent quality issues by looking at their
determinants and evolution over time.
This paper intends to contribute to this debate by investigating the value determinants of a
sample of UK academic patents. Three main research questions are investigated. (1) Which are
the main determinants for academic patent value? (2) Is ownership structure correlated with patent
value? (3) To what extent does new technological knowledge produced by academic researchers ow
across institutional and national borders?
The main interest in studying UK academic patenting resides in the institutional features of
British universities, which place them in between the two extremes of state-run, highly-centralised
university systems typical of a large part of continental Europe, and the highly decentralised, largely
private US system. While UK universities lack the nancial power of private and large public US
universities, they are closer to the latter both in terms of administrative autonomy, access to a exible
academic labour market for scientists, and expertise in dealing with IPR issues.
The sample used in this paper is composed of 1376 patents applied for at the European Patent
O¢ ce (EPO) and invented by academic scientists in the UK between 1990 and 2001.
Patent data cover inventions produced by British academic scientists in active service in 2001, for
1Primarily as a result of budget cuts during the Thatcher government (Meyer and Tang, 2007).
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which a patent application was led at the EPO. In particular, the data contain applications submit-
ted not only by scientists and their universities, but also applications by companies, governmental
and non-prot organisations, as long as they cover scientistsinventions.
In what follows, we dene academic patents as those related to universities through their (acad-
emic) inventors rather than university ownership. In particular, we always consider academic patents,
and among them we dene university patents as those owned by universities, and corporate patents
as those owned by private companies.
The empirical results show that patent value, approximated by forward patent citations, is posi-
tively correlated with a professors patenting experience and with his scientic productivity. More-
over, patents invented by academic scientists and owned by the business sectors (corporate patents)
have more forward citations in the rst years after ling than academic patents owned by a university
(university patents), but this di¤erence declines when considering a longer period of time till to dis-
appear. Finally, in terms of knowledge spillovers, some results show that, considering only citations
from the business sector, this di¤erence is even increased, casting some doubts on the e¤ectiveness
of the policy initiatives recently introduced in Europe aimed at encouraging universities to achieve
more patents out of their research and at easing the knowledge transfer to the private sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the existing literature on patent value
and its determinants, with particular attention to academic patent quality. Section 3 illustrates the
data on UK academic patents used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents empirical strategies
and Section 5 discusses empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The concept of patent value is not always precisely dened in the patent literature, as far as it has
no intrinsic characteristic to be objective and is not unique at all. A patent may have a huge value
for a rm but low for society. In other words, patent value may be analysed through its intrinsic
technological properties or through its ability to generate prots for the company applying for it. It is
widely recognised, for example, that the patent system has also been used by companies for strategic
motives2, as far as patents may be used as insurance for (potential) future technological space against
competitors or, vice versa, to restrict competitorsfuture technological opportunities and submarine
areas of technology where competitors are working (Scott, 2007). Moreover, companies may choose
to patent defensively in order to use them in negotiations with other rms (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
In this case, the value of the patent may be higher for the company than for society3.
In this paper, because we consider patents produced by academic scientists, we analyse the value
of the patent from a social point of view, by estimating the impact that a patent may have on the
production and di¤usion of knowledge itself. According to this, the social value of a patent concerns
the development of public knowledge itself, without taking into consideration expected revenues for
the market.
In this context, the classical measures of patent value used in the literature are (1) the number of
forward citations, which point out the relevance of the patent for further research, (2) the occurrence
2See Orsenigo and Sterzi (2010) for further considerations on the role of patents and their use in di¤erent industries.
3For example Blind et al. (2009) show that companiesdefense strategies in patenting are sources of fewer forward
citations to their patents.
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(or the number) of backward citations in the search report, which may invalidate the granted process
or lead to patent opposition4, (3) the success of the patent itself, i.e. the patent application acceptance
(Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de La Potterie, 2000), (4) the generality of the patent, which shows
that it has been important for a broad eld of research. At the same time, measures more related to
the patent value at the rm level are (5) number of claims5, which reects the breadth of technology
claimed and imbedded in the patent itself and, related to the number of claims, (6) patent disputes
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Bessen, 2008), and (7) patent renewal (Pakes and Schankerman,
1984).
In the empirical analysis we use forward patent citations, also because previous studies have shown
that these are highly correlated with measures of the social value of the invention (Trajtenberg, 1990,
Albert et al., 1991) as well as with its private value (Harho¤ et al., 1999, Harho¤ and Reitzig, 2004,
Hall et al., 2005)6.
Despite much research on academic patents, little evidence has been provided on the quality of
academic patents. However, remarkable exceptions are to be found mostly in the US context, where
the debate is mainly concentrated on the e¤ects of the Bayh-Dole Act. Changes in federal laws at
the beginning of the 1980s made it signicantly easier for universities to claim property rights to
discoveries deriving from federal funds, with the consequence that university patenting exploded.
Basically, in the US context, the most inuential papers on this issue claimed that the importance of
overall US university patents declined after 1980 (Henderson et al., 1998), but that this e¤ect would
vanish by controlling for the new entry of inexperienced patenters (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002) and
for changes in the intertemporal distribution of citations to university patents (Sampat et al., 2003).
In the European context, only a few works explicitly deal with the quality of academic patents.
Sapsalis et al. (2006) and Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for Belgian universities, Czarnitzki
et al. (2008, 2011) for German academic patents and Crespi et al. (2010) for a sample of European
academic patents (the Patval survey) are exceptions. In all cases the patent quality is proxied by the
number of patent citations received by a patent from any subsequent patent application.
Sapsalis et al. (2006) compare 239 corporate and 155 academic patents invented in Belgium
between 1985 and 1999 in the biotech eld. Their results show that the determinants of patent
value are mostly the same. In particular, as found later in Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2007),
controlling for age (the newer a patent, the more limited the probability of being cited) and the
number of inventors involved in the inventions (larger teams would imply higher expected return),
the number of co-assignees and the number of non-patent self-citations to the literature are positive
4The classical view of backward citations considers these as a potential determinant of opposition: the patentee
has the incentive to put (backward) citations that make the patent more resistant to invalidation problems (Harho¤
and Reitzig, 2004). If this might be true from a private point of view, this is clearly not true from a social point of
view. A greater number of (backward) citations signies that the step of novelty of inventive activity is not very high.
Moreover, the patent may be derived more from a cumulative process than an innovative idea
5The claims in the patent dene the property rights protected by the patent; therefore the patentee has the incentive
to claim as much as possible in the application, but at the same time the patent examiner may require that the claims
be narrowed before granting it.
6 In particular, Harho¤ et al. (1999) analyse the relationship between patent citations and the payment of patent
renewal fees, while Hall et al. (2005) study the relationship between patent citations and rm market value. However,
other scholars cast some doubts on the use of citations as a measure of patent quality: for example, Bessen (2008) on
the one hand shows that highly cited patents are more valuable, but on the other hand, points out that patent citations
explain little variance in the value.
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correlated with the patent value, whereas non-self-citations to the scientic literature are negatively
associated.
Czarnitzki et al. (2008), through a sample of 4973 German academic patents between 1980
and 2003 across all elds of science, nd that academic patents are characterised by a higher level
of knowledge externalities (measured as forward citations) than the control group of non-academic
patents. Moreover, they nd that experience matters, to the extent that academic scientists with no
previous patenting experience ll out patents of lower value than academic incumbents.
Czarnitzki et al. (2011) nd that short term citations (up to 5 years after publication) are
associated with corporate ownership, while long term citations (more than 5 years) are linked to
university ownership. They interpret this result as a fact that corporations tend to source knowledge
which yields immediate returns and tend to ignore more basic patents that result in later applications.
Finally, in the same context, Crespi et al. (2010), through a sample of European academic patents,
ask whether a relationship exists between patent ownership and patent value. Their results show
that there is not much evidence that university-owned patents are more used [. . . ] than university
invented-patents that are owned by rms.
All these studies put their emphasis on patent value, without explicitly considering if and where
the academic knowledge is able to spill over and across di¤erent types of institutions. In dealing with
academic patents an important issue is in fact to assess to what extent they are able to narrow the
gap between industry and university.
For this purpose, beyond a mere counting of citations, we are also able to consider from where
the citations come. In this vein we use patent citations not only to assess the patent value but also
to track the knowledge ows. Disentangling the citations according to their ownership we assess the
extent to which university patents are e¤ective in the knowledge transfer process to the business
sector.
3 Data description
The data used in this paper were collected during the course of a project sponsored by the European
Commission7. One of the purposes of the project, called CID, was to create a database on academic
patenting for the UK, which contains both applications submitted by universities and applications
submitted by companies and not-for-prot institutions as a result of a variety of agreements between
such organisations and academic scientists.
The CID-database8 originates from the EP-INV database, which is part of the larger EP-KITES
database and provides information on patents applied for at the EPO, and from the RAE2001
database, which collects information on individual scientists in active service in 2001 in universities
and higher education institutions in the UK.
From the EP-INV database we extract the UK-EP-INV database which contains all the UK
patents, i.e. all EPO patent applications with at least one inventor residing in the UK.
The UK-EP-INV contains 58,268 UK patent applications between 1990 and 2001. Data fall into
four broad categories:
7NEST-2006-PATH-Cul, Contract n.: FP6 043345
8See Guarisco et al., 2009 for a detailed overview of the methodology used.
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1. Patent data: priority dates, technological class (IPC, OST7, OST30) and number of claims.
2. Inventor data (name, surname, residence)
3. Applicant data, such as name, country, and nature (business company, university, public
research organisation, or individual)
4. Citations (forward and backward)
The RAE2001 database collects information on scientists in active service in 2001. We have
data on 60,672 academic researchers and 173 institutions. Biographical information on individuals is
limited to department (or research centre) of a¢ liation, surname and initials of the name. Moreover,
the RAE2001 database allows us to retrieve the four publications (title and journal) for each scientist
which are used to assess individual scientic productivity9.
Basically, the identication of academic inventors was obtained in two steps10. First, we matched
the name from the inventorsnames in the UK-EP-INV dataset with the list of researchers in the
RAE200111 dataset (excluding evident inconsistencies between the professors discipline and the
patent technological class). Then, a web survey conrmed the potential matches, avoiding possible
homonymy.
We end up with a sample of 616 conrmed UK academic inventors12 and we are able to identify
1376 patent applications for a period of 12 years (1990-2001) in which at least one of the UK academic
inventors was employed by a university (we label these academic patents).
The six most active patenting UK universities (see Table A1 in Appendix) are Oxford University13
(with 73 patent applications), followed by the University of Manchester (34), Cambridge University
(31), the University of Bristol (24), and University College London (23) and Southampton (23).
Among the top patenting companies involving academic scientists Zeneca is at the top (with 27
patents), followed by Cancer Research Technology (21) and other UK multinational companies such
as Sterix (19), BP Chemicals (16) and British Nuclear Fuels (16). The Medical Research Council
(MRC) with 32 patent applications is at the top among governmental institutions, hospitals and
other public research centres.
Based upon the DT-7 re-classication of IPC codes proposed by the Observatoire des Sciences et
des Techniques (OST, 2008) the most important technological eld (see Table A2 in the Appendix)
is that of Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology with around 36 percent of academic patents, followed
by Scientic and Control Instruments (21%) and Chemicals and Materials (17%). These gures are
similar to those for France and Italy (see Lissoni et al., 2008 for a comparison with the French, Italian
and Swedish cases).
9Even though individuals are not forced to submit information about their research activity, they have a great
incentive to do so, given that the amount of research funding made available to each research unit and department
depends strictly upon the ranking produced by the RAE.
10The methodology used to build the CID-KEINS database largely follows what was implemented in the case of the
KEINS database (Lissoni et al., 2006, 2008).
11The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is a periodical evaluation of British universitiesscientic activities. It
is conducted jointly by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Scottish Higher Educa-
tion Funding Council (SHEFC), the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW), and the Department of
Education for Northern Ireland (DENI). Its aim consists in grading the quality of academic research and to enable
governmental funding bodies to distribute some of their public funds to universities with respect to the quality of
research carried out in each department (Review of Research Assessment, 2003).
12For further analysis on the characteristics of UK academic inventors, see Meissner and Sterzi (2011).
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If similarities exist in terms of technological contents, what di¤ers is the ownership regime. Lissoni
et al. (2008) show that in Sweden, France and Italy, the majority around 61, 72 and 81 per cent
respectively  of academic patents are not in the hands of the university, but are owned by the
business sector. On the other hand, Thursby et al. (2009) present a di¤erent picture for the USA,
where private companies hold no more than 25 percent of academic patents.
The UK is in between the two: academic patents owned by the private sector (we label these
corporate patents) make up 50 percent of the total, while university-owned patents (university
patents) account for 40 percent. Interestingly, if we take into account that before 1993 the British
Technology Group (BTG)14 was public and operating as a brokerage agency in support of universities,
these weights seem to be constant over the period considered (see Table 1).
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE]
The ownership di¤erences between UK and other European countries clearly reect the institu-
tional diversities. The greater percentage of university-owned patents in the UK is mainly attributed
to the tradition of involvement of the university in IP management: the UK was in fact one of the
rst countries to implement university ownership15, when in 1977 the Patent Act declares that an
employee invention is owned by the employer (in this case, the university). However, a similar IPR
regulation takes place in France and in Italy (till 2001), while Sweden adopts systems mainly centered
on assigning IPR ownership to the inventor.
Given that, it may be surprising that such a high percentage of academic patents is owned
by the business sector. However, di¤erent explanations arise: (1) universities in the UK followed
considerably di¤erent strategies in managing IP; the most well-known case is that of Cambridge
University that until 2001 did not enforce fully the university ownership right (Geuna and Rossi,
2011); (2) the e¤ectiveness of the Technology Transfer O¢ ce (TTO) and its IP strategies di¤ers
across universities: some TTOs may prefer to le as many applications as they can, while others
may prefer to seek patent protection only for inventions they consider commercially feasible (Meyer
and Tang, 2007); (3) even though university ownership was already the legal default, it was usually
weakly enforced (Crespi et al., 2010); (4) the ownership decision may be a result of rational behaviour:
academic scientists with valuable ideas may prefer to bypass the TTO and look directly for companies
where they can develop their idea, attracted by better equipment and higher royalties.
The next section presents the variables and the econometric model that aims at explaining the
quality and knowledge di¤usion of UK academic patents.
4 Empirical strategy
To analyse the determinants of the patent quality a cross-section analysis is conducted16. The
dependent variable of the model is the number of patent citations (FPC), as many authors have used
to approximate the patent value (see Section 2).
14The BTG share of academic patents is here presented separately from that of other companies, in order to demon-
strate its role over the years, which is marked by a sharp decline right after privatisation
15For further discussion on university IPR regulations in Europe, see Geuna and Rossi (2011)
16Duration models (e.g. event history models) may also be applied but the core of the paper is to evaluate quality and
knowledge di¤usion without considering its quickness (i.e. the time before the rst citation). However, for completeness
we also present the Cox proportional hazard model in Section 5.4.
6
We implement Poisson models which provide a natural way of dealing with high skewness17 of
the dependent variable and at the same time take into account its integer nature. In particular, a
negative binomial model is applied to explicitly model the presence of signicance over dispersion.
More specically, we estimate the following negative binomial:
E [CjX] = exp
hX
lTECHl +
X
jY EARj +
X
jCVj +
X
dyV Dy
i
where C is the number of forward citations for the focal patent and X is the vector containing
the explanatory variables; TECH is a set of dummy variables for the di¤erent technological class l
(l=1, 2, . . . , 30); YEAR is a set of dummy variables for the di¤erent priority year (j=1990,. . . 2001);
CV and VD are vectors that contain the control variables and the main determinants respectively.
4.1 Dependent Variable
The basic dependent variable is the number of forward citations received with the exclusion of self-
citations at the inventor level18 - that is, all citations in which the cited and citing patent applications
share at least a common inventor - which is our proxy to patent value.
Table 2 shows that corporate patents (academic patents owned by the business sector) are on
average cited more extensively (1.26 citations in the rst three years following the priority date) than
university patents (0.84) in almost all the years considered. The di¤erence is overall statistically
signicant, even if declining in the last 3 years considered.
[TABLE 2 NEAR HERE]
Of course, patents are not instantaneously cited after their ling: for this reason, the older a
patent is the more citations it receives on average. This explains the decreasing number of forward
citations since 199519.
For robustness, forward citations are computed in two di¤erent windows of time: within three
and six years following the priority date20.
Moreover, beyond the mere count of citations, we are also able to consider where the citations
come from. In particular, patent citations are also used to track knowledge ows (see among others,
Ja¤e et al., 1993; Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002; Bacchiocchi and Montobbio, 2010): disentangling
the citations according to their ownership we assess the extent to which university patents are e¤ective
in the knowledge transfer process to the business sector.
Of course, science policies deserve great importance for the extent to which new technological
knowledge produced by academic researchers ows across institutional and national boundaries.
For this purpose, patent citations are disentangled according to their origin - citations from
university patents, corporate patents and internationalpatents - in order to assess the di¤usion of
knowledge into the realm of industry and outside national borders.
17Only 31 patents have more than 10 citations, whereas 526 patents have no citations.
18By excluding also self-citations at company (applicant) level we get similar values, which are not displayed but are
available upon request.
19A set of year dummies in the specication controls for this phenomenon.
20 In the following six years from the priority years, university patents receive on average 1.69 citations, compared to
2.18 for corporate patents. The di¤erence is still signicant.
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Table 3 shows that on average university-owned patents received more citations only from other
university patents. In other words, the knowledge produced within academia seems to be conned
to within its borders, raising some doubts for the role of the IPR ownership model as a tool to
favor knowledge ows to the private sector. Moreover, results indicate that di¤usion seems to be
geographically localised: within-country citations are more numerous for both university patents and
corporate patents.
Academic inventors of patents owned by business companies are found to hold brokerage positions
to the extent that they are able to bridge the academic and industrial communities (Lissoni, 2010).
[TABLE 3 NEAR HERE]
4.2 Controls and Main determinants
Among control variables, we consider the technological class of patents, based upon the OST-30
classication, and 11 year dummies (1991-2001) in order to keep under control the inuence of the
year in which patents were led at the EPO and to take into account that older patents have more
probability of being cited, ceteris paribus.
Then, we control for the number of inventors (INV) listed in the patent: at a company level this
could be seen as a proxy of the importance for the company itself (Sapsalis et al., 2006) and it could
also be a proxy for the research e¤ort. The average size in the sample is 3.3 inventors per patent.
The number of claims (CLAIMS)21 controls for a patents breadth, which may be the value
driverof the patent: Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) show that the probability for a patent to be
disputed increases with its number of claims.
The number of co-assignees (COAS) reects the collaboration among two or more institutions.
The higher the number of co-assignees, the higher is the expected patent value. However, little
collaboration seems to take place: only nine percent of academic patents are co-applied for with
another assignee (15 percent considering only university-owned patents).
Given the descriptive statistics on patent quality, patent ownership is taken into account. In
particular, four dummies are considered: COMPANY (which takes a value=1 if the patent is owned
only by the business sector), INDIVIDUAL (=1 if the professor is the owner), GOVERNMENT (=1
if the patent is owned by governmental institutions, hospitals and other public research centres) and
BTG (British Technology Group)22. The reference case is the University dummy (=1 whenever a
university results as one of the patent applicants)23.
For the extent to which an invention is at least partly based on scientic knowledge we consider
non-patent citations (NPCs), i.e. basically citations to scientic journals. NPC is a dummy which
equals to 1 as far as a patent application has at least one non-patent citation in the search report.
21The claims in the patent dene the property rights protected by the patent; therefore the patentee has an incentive
to claim as much as possible in the application, but at the same time the patent examiner may require for the claims
to be narrowed before granting
22The BTG share of academic patents is here presented separately from that of other companies, in order to demon-
strate its role over the years, which is marked by a sharp decline right after privatisation
23We avoided multiple ownership and decided to follow this rule: whenever a patent has been applied for by a
university and another institution at the same time is categorized with the University dummy; the same reasoning
applies to the government, companyand BTGrespectively. For descriptive purposes the cases of patents co-applied
by university and company are 48 (3.5%).
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Quite surprisingly, corporate patents cite the scientic literature more frequently than university
patents. However, these results are similar to the ndings of Sapsalis et al. (2006), even though they
compare academic patents with non-academic patents (patents which do not involve any academic
scientists)24.
We then speculate whether a professors patenting experience is important for his patent quality.
As demonstrated by Mowery et al. (2002) and Czarnitzki et al. (2008), academics learn to patent
through experience in patenting. For each patent we build the PROFESSORS EXPERIENCE
variable which is the number of patents applied for by the professors before the patent considered.
Finally, in order to assess the relationship between patenting and publishing, we control for the
academic inventors intrinsic ability by his SCIENTIFIC QUALITY, which is measured as the average
impact factor of the journals of the (four) publications selected for the 2001 RAE25. Because this
measure reects the scientic productivity between 1996 (the last RAE before the 2001 RAE) and
2001, in the econometric specication we consider this restricted span of years.
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present the variables description and selected descriptive
statistics.
5 Empirical results
Tables 4 and 5 present the econometric results of the model dened in the previous section. We
rst estimate the academic patent value (Table 4). Then, the forward citations are disaggregated
according to their origin to track the knowledge ows (Table 5).
5.1 Patent value
Table 4 shows the result of the Negative Binomial for equation 1. The rst remarkable result is that
corporate patents receive on average about 33 percent (according to the forward patent citations
in the rst three years after the patent priority year) more citations than the university patents.
However, this di¤erence goes down to 14 percent (and signicant only at the 85% level) when we
consider six years as a window of time. These results conrm our ndings on the comparison of
means (see the previous section) and are in line with Czarnitzki et al. (2011) who nd that short
term citations (up to ve years after publication) are associated with corporate ownership, compared
to long term citations (more than ve years) with university ownership. Government, individual and
BTG patents do not seem to di¤er from University patents.
Nevertheless, we have to be careful in interpreting these results correctly to the extent that patent
ownership may su¤er from the endogeneity problem: the ownership variable may in fact be the result
of professorsrational behaviour. It is possible that professors with more valuable ideas may prefer
to bypass the university TTO and directly seek a rm where the idea can be developed with better
equipment and higher royalties.
24They suggest that academic patents may protect more emerging technologies that are by denition less documented
in the scientic literature.
25Whenever a patent has been applied for by two professors in the database we assigned the maximum of the average
impact factor.
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Another interesting result is that professors with lower patent experience le patents of lower qual-
ity than academic incumbents. PROFESSORS EXPERIENCE is positive and signicant according
to the FPC(6).
Collaborations do not seem to matter as the number of co-assignees is not associated with a
positive and signicant parameter in any of the models.
Contrary to our expectations, having a non-patent citation (NPC) is associated with a lower
quality; however this result is in line with the ndings of Sapsalis et al. (2006). They suggest that
NPCs may have a negative or non-signicant impact because scientic papers are available to all
inventors, not providing any advantage to the citing patent.
The nal important value determinant considered is scientic quality, measured as the average
impact factor of the scientic journals of the articles selected for the 2001 RAE. We recall that this
measure reects scientic productivity between 1996 and 2001 (the last RAE before the 2001 RAE),
and so in the econometric specication we consider only a restricted span of years (1996-2001). Our
results show a positive correlation between patent quality and scientic quality. In all the models
SCIENTIFC QUALITY is positive and signicant.
With respect to control variables our results are in line with the literature: everything equals,
(1) older patents receive more citations than younger patents, as evinced by the year dummies; (2)
the number of claims is positively correlated; (3) the size of the academic research team seems to
have a non-signicant inuence on the patent value. The latter result deserves an explanation. For
non-academic patents the size of the research team (measured as the number of inventors listed in
the patent application) usually has a positive correlation with the patent value (see, among others,
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Sapsalis et al., 2006): in a competitive framework, because the
number of researchers represents a cost for the company it is reasonable to expect a higher patent
value. However in the academic context, as pointed out by Liebeskind and Oliver (1999), scientists
prefer to limit the size of their research teams to minimize disagreements and disputes over claims
and IPRs.
[TABLE 4 NEAR HERE]
5.2 Knowledge transfer
For public policy it is a matter of great importance the degree to which new technological knowledge
produced by academic researchers ows across institutional and national boundaries.
If patent citations have been extensively used as a proxy for patent value, they have also been
used to track knowledge ows. In this vein we are able not only to assess the patent value but also
to evaluate where the patent-related academic knowledge goes.
We disentangle forward patent citations according to their ownership and location origin: in
particular we consider University and Company patent citations to refer to the ownership, and Inter-
national and National to the location (residence) of the inventors. A simple look at the distribution
of patent citations by their origin is eloquent: considering only citations from patents applied for by
university and companies, 7% of citations to university patents come from corporate patents (i.e. 93%
of citations received come from other university patents), while 5% of citations to corporate patents
come from university patents (i.e. 95% of citations received come from other patents applied by
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companies). These gures show clearly the di¢ culty the knowledge spills over di¤erent institutional
boundaries.
From the econometric point of view, Equation 1 is then estimated considering the four measures
of knowledge spillovers as dependent variables. The same value determinants and control variables
are considered; in particular, our attention is addressed to the ownership dummies. To be clear, the
dependent variables (see Table 5) are the number of forward citations within six years following the
priority date respectively from patents applied by university (Column 1), by companies (Column 2),
patents with non-UK inventors (Column 3) and with only UK inventors.
Table 5 - in the rst column - shows that, controlling for other determinants, corporate patents
receive on average about 98 percent less university citations than university patents. This is strong
evidence of little (almost non-existent) knowledge transfer from the business sector to academia. It
seems that university patents build their knowledge only looking at the pool of knowledge already
existing within academia.
At the same time, corporate patents receive more citations (more than three times) from corporate
patents, demonstrating strong evidence of little knowledge transfer from academia to the business
sector. The company dummy in column 2 is positive and highly signicant. This result should be
driven by the interpersonal links among inventors (Balconi et al. 2004) which di¤use information
within the scientic community: each researcher has a number of links (his co-inventors) which are
basically the channel through which the knowledge spills over and co-invention links allow for some
degree of knowledge transfer (Lissoni, 2010). Hence, because corporate patents generally involve not
only academic researchers but also researchers working in the business sector, the presence of the
latter type of researchers facilitates knowledge transmission to other rms.
Together, these results produce a picture where there is no knowledge fertilisation across public
(university) and private institutions and cast some doubts on the role of university ownership as an
instrument for fostering and facilitating knowledge transfer between academia and industry.
Finally, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 we compare the geographical reach of knowledge ows
from university and corporate patents. In column 3, the dependent variable is the number of forward
citations from non-UK patents, that is, patents invented by inventors residing abroad. The results
clearly show that knowledge ows from university patents are more geographically localised than those
from corporate patents: corporate patents receive on average about 48 percent more international
citations than university patents. At the same time, this di¤erence disappears when considering only
national citations.
[TABLE 5 NEAR HERE]
5.3 Robustness check (1). Granted patents
In the previous analysis all data refer to applications, and therefore include both granted and non-
granted patents. This decision was followed mainly for two reasons: (1) given that the average
time from ling to granting is almost 4 years, and even more when considering the priority year, this
choice would have created some bias for more recent patent applications; (2) using patent applications
instead of granted patents would allow us also to include less-experienced academic inventors, i.e.
those who try to patent without success.
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However, the previous results are robust even stronger even considering only granted patents.
The results are displayed in Table A5 in the Appendix.
5.4 Robustness check (2). Survival analysis models
As far as we have studied the impact of covariates on the number of forward citations, we have
considered the Poisson models. However, in dealing with the value of academic patents, beyond the
number of citations, it is also possible to analyse the time a patent requires to be cited. For this
purpose, the survival analysis model allows us to study durations from an initial date (which is the
priority date of the patent) until the date of the event (the priority date of the citing patent, if any).
The priority dates of patents in our sample run from January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2001. The
terminal date of observation is August 30, 2008; the patents without citations by August 30, 2008
were considered as censored at that date. Hence, our data consist of a cross-section of durations
t1; t2; ::tn 2 T and allow us to estimate the probability that the event citationappears in the next
period.
We assumed a proportional hazard model and opted for a semi-parametric Cox model that enables
the e¤ect of di¤erent variables on the hazard to be determined.
In particular, the hazard function hi(t) of a patent i is expressed as:
hi (t) = hi (t; xi) = h0 (t) exp

x
0
i; 

where h0(t) is an unspecied baseline hazard function representing the probability of being cited
conditional on the fact that the patent was not cited until time t, xi is a vector of explanatory
variables for the i-th patent and  is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. Positive
coe¢ cients imply that the hazard rate increases and the corresponding probability of survival (i.e.
being without citations) decreases.
To control for the cohort and the technological class e¤ect we estimated a semi-parametric Cox
model which is stratied according to the year and OST30 technological class of the cited patent.
The assumption is that the parameters entering the Cox likelihood are the same for every cohort
and technological class: the stratied Cox model allows the form of the underlying hazard function
to vary across levels of stratication variables.
The test of proportional-hazards assumption indicates an absence of evidence to contradict the
proportionality assumption.
Table 6 displays the results of the Cox model and shows how the characteristics of academic
patents are related to the citation probability. The results are in line with the Poisson models.
The Company ownership dummy has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the hazard rate: corporate
patents are generally more cited than the baseline university-owned ones. Finally, scientic quality
and the number of claims again have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the probability of being cited.
[TABLE 6 NEAR HERE]
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6 Conclusions and further research
This paper has presented an empirical analysis of the determinants of patent value and knowledge
di¤usion in a sample of UK academic patents, that is, patents where at least one of the inven-
tors is a UK academic scientist. In particular, it has considered patent applications submitted not
only by scientists and their universities, but also those by companies, governmental and non-prot
organisations, as long as they cover the academic scientistsinventions.
The rst objective of this paper was to assess the determinants of university patent value (proxied
by forward patent citations). The second objective was to evaluate to what extent new technological
knowledge produced by academic scientists ows across institutional and national borders.
Regarding the rst research question, we found that, controlling for priority years and technologi-
cal classes, a professors patent experience and scientic quality are correlated with the patent value.
That being so, the role of prolic academic inventors and scientic stars must be carefully analysed.
Then, an important role is played by patent ownership: corporate patents - academic patents
owned by companies receive on average more patent citations than university patents - academic
patents owned by universities. In detail, according to the econometric results, corporate patents
receive on average about 33 percent more citations than the university patents in the rst three years
after the patent priority year. However, this di¤erence goes down to 14 percent (and signicant only
at the 85% level) when we consider a longer window of time.
. This result may be partly explained by the fact that UK universities, as well as other European
universities, su¤er from a lack of tradition and experience in IP management. Thus, the role of TTOs
would be an important factor to control for in further research.
The second research question was related to what extent new technological knowledge produced
by academic researchers ows across institutional and national boundaries. Our results showed
that there is no knowledge fertilisation across public (university) and private institutions: university
patents cite mainly other university patents and the same reasoning applies to corporate patents.
Moreover, knowledge ows from university patents are even more geographically localised than those
from corporate patents.
From a policy prospective, these results cast some doubts on the role of university ownership as
an instrument to foster and facilitate knowledge transfer between academia and industry and raise
serious questions about the e¤ect of policies towards increasing the role of technology transfer o¢ ces
in managing university patents.
One justication for university ownership is that it manages the intellectual property for the
academic inventor as it performs a service as intermediary between inventor and potential licensees.
The general idea is that the university, through the TTO, is able to reduce the asymmetric information
problem. Given the lower costs of search, because of specialisation and lower opportunity cost of
time, it has knowledge superior to that of the inventor as to which rms might be interested in
the invention. Moreover, through its reputation, the university may also act as a signal to private
business.
However, if the university does not have superior knowledge and if the academic inventor already
has a strong reputation and connections with the private sector, university ownership may not be
optimal, perhaps resulting in less e¤ort by the inventor. Furthermore university ownership may
decrease the exchange of knowledge between the academic and business sector as far as academic
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inventors of patents owned by business companies are found to hold brokerage positions.
To this extent, an alternative model which vests ownership with the inventor and then leaves him
the possibility to choose the commercialisation path for the invention (Kenney and Patton, 2009)
may be preferred.
Although this analysis improves on the existing literature by considering a novel dataset on
UK academic patents to illustrate the determinants of patents value and their relationship with
the ownership regime, it does not claim to provide a complete picture of the ownership-quality
relationship. In particular, we do not assess whether the relationship between patent value and
ownership is causal as we do not question for what reasons academic patents are owned by university
or private sector. The ownership decision may be the result of rational behaviour, bringing to light
endogeneity problems. This constraint must be taken into account when interpreting the results and
further research into this is not only desirable but also necessary.
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Table 1.  
Number of academic patents by ownership and years (%) 
  University  Corporate Government Individual  BTG  Tot. Patents
1990 8 14% 33 59% 7 13% 1 2% 7 13% 56
1991 16 28% 23 40% 7 12% 2 4% 9 16% 57
1992 16 27% 27 45% 6 10% 1 2% 10 17% 60
1993 13 22% 40 69% 4 7% 0 0% 1 2% 58
1994 39 37% 59 56% 4 4% 0 0% 4 4% 106
1995 43 38% 60 54% 8 7% 0 0% 1 1% 112
1996 48 38% 59 46% 10 8% 5 4% 6 5% 128
1997 56 40% 77 55% 5 4% 2 1% 1 1% 141
1998 85 50% 74 44% 7 4% 3 2% 1 1% 170
1999 92 45% 103 50% 8 4% 0 0% 2 1% 205
2000 92 47% 87 45% 4 2% 6 3% 5 3% 194
2001 42 47% 46 52% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 89
All years 550 40% 688 50% 71 5% 20 1% 47 3% 1376
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  
Patent quality (FPC 3) by ownership: mean values (# of patents) 
  University Patents  Corporate Patents 
diff= mean 
U- mean C 
Ha: 
diff 
< 0   
sig. 
1990 1.50 8 1.15 33 0.35   
1991 0.75 16 0.70 23 0.05   
1992 0.63 16 1.04 27 -0.41   
1993 0.77 13 1.98 40 -1.21   
1994 0.74 39 1.25 59 -0.51 * 
1995 1.19 43 0.88 60 0.30   
1996 0.69 48 1.69 59 -1.01 *** 
1997 1.05 56 2.01 77 -0.96 * 
1998 0.89 85 1.34 74 -0.44 * 
1999 0.89 92 1.10 103 -0.20   
2000 0.64 92 0.77 87 -0.13   
2001 0.64 42 0.98 46 -0.34   
Total 
sample 0.84 550 1.26 688 -0.42 *** 
Self citations at inventor level are excluded 
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Table 3.  
Patent quality and knowledge flows by ownership (mean values) 
  University Patents Corporate patents 
diff= mean 
U- mean C
Ha: 
diff ≠ 
0   sig.
FPC (3 years) 0.84 550 1.26 688 -0.42 *** 
FPC (6 years) 1.69 550 2.18 688 -0.48 *** 
FPC (3 years) excluding self-citations at applicant level 0.75 550 1.13 688 -0.37 *** 
FPC (6 years) excluding self-citations at applicant level 1.56 550 1.98 688 -0.41 ** 
FPC (6 years from UNIVERSITY patents)* 1.57 550 0.003 688 1.57 *** 
FPC (6 years from CORPORATE patents)* 0.11 550 1.70 688 -1.18 *** 
FPC (6 years from NON UK patents)** 0.62 550 0.99 688 -0.37 *** 
FPC (6 years from ONLY UK patents)*** 1.06 550 1.18 688 -0.11   
Self-citations at inventor level are excluded; * only UK applicants are considered, patents applied for by individuals are 
not considered; ** patents with at least one non-UK inventor; *** patents with only UK inventors. 
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Table 4.  
Econometric results (A): Forward patent citation determinants 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 5 Model 6 
 FPC(3) FPC(6) FPC(3) FPC(6) 
 [All sample] [All sample] [1996-2001] [1996-2001] 
Quality determinants     
     
Professor's experience 0.010 0.019*** 0.014 0.021** 
  (0.0087) (0.0072) (0.0099) (0.0084) 
CAOS 0.075 0.042 -0.024 -0.072 
  (0.090) (0.075) (0.11) (0.089) 
Ownership (Ref: University)     
Company 0.29*** 0.13
† 0.22* 0.070 
  (0.10) (0.084) (0.12) (0.10) 
Government 0.13 -0.035 0.071 -0.18 
  (0.22) (0.18) (0.30) (0.26) 
Individual 0.091 -0.018 0.44 0.44 
  (0.48) (0.38) (0.58) (0.46) 
BTG 0.017 -0.054 0.11 0.078 
  (0.28) (0.22) (0.43) (0.37) 
NPC -0.29* -0.41*** -0.025 -0.19 
  (0.15) (0.13) (0.20) (0.17) 
SCIENTIFIC QUALITY   0.043*** 0.035*** 
    (0.013) (0.011) 
Control Variables     
INV 0.045* 0.025 0.095*** 0.062** 
  (0.027) (0.023) (0.033) (0.029) 
CLAIMS 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0037) 
1990 Ref Ref   
1991 -0.56* -0.40   
  (0.33) (0.26)   
1992 -0.27 -0.064   
  (0.31) (0.24)   
1993 0.040 0.082   
  (0.30) (0.24)   
1994 -0.21 -0.28   
  (0.27) (0.22)   
1995 -0.29 -0.32   
  (0.27) (0.22)   
1996 -0.022 -0.27 0.88*** 1.17*** 
  (0.27) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) 
1997 -0.025 -0.34 0.75*** 0.98*** 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) 
1998 -0.26 -0.57*** 0.61** 0.83*** 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) 
1999 -0.48* -0.93*** 0.34 0.44** 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) 
2000 -0.59** -1.04*** 0.26 0.35* 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) 
2001 -0.75** -1.33***   
  (0.30) (0.25) Ref Ref 
      
Constant -0.37 0.71** -1.30*** -0.58 
  (0.39) (0.31) (0.45) (0.38) 
Fields dummy (OST 30) yes yes Yes yes 
Lnalpha 0.53*** 0.24*** 0.47*** 0.23*** 
  (0.080) (0.065) (0.10) (0.086) 
Log Likelihood -1861.43 -2487.49 -1230.06 -1561.41 
Observations 1376 1376 927 927 
Self-citations at the inventor level are excluded; levels of significance (probability thresholds) :†<15%, * <10%, 
** <5%, *** <1% 
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Table 5.  
Econometric results (B): Forward patent citation determinants by type 
COEFFICIENT Model 1 Model 3 Model 5 Model 7 
  FPC FPC FPC FPC 
  UNIVERSITY COMPANY INTERNATIONAL NATIONAL 
Quality determinants     
      
Professor's experience 0.020 0.017 -0.0027 0.031*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.0098) (0.0077) 
COAS 0.065 1.68*** 0.13 -0.027 
  (0.16) (0.26) (0.10) (0.091) 
Ownership (Ref: University)     
      
Company -6.34*** 3.91*** 0.38*** -0.023 
  (0.71) (0.27) (0.11) (0.093) 
Government -2.14*** 2.16*** 0.21 -0.20 
  (0.34) (0.37) (0.24) (0.20) 
Individual -18.8 -28.2 0.15 -0.21 
  (2009) (615) (0.53) (0.41) 
BTG -19.1 3.01*** -0.13 -0.071 
  (1470) (0.42) (0.32) (0.23) 
NPC -0.18 -0.83*** -0.24 -0.57*** 
  (0.24) (0.22) (0.17) (0.15) 
      
Control Variables     
      
INV -0.049 0.010 0.017 0.024 
  (0.048) (0.038) (0.030) (0.025) 
CLAIMS 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 
  (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0040) (0.0034) 
      
Constant -0.89 -5.59*** -0.25 0.28 
  (0.77) (0.67) (0.42) (0.34) 
Years dummy yes yes yes yes 
Fields dummy (OST 30) yes yes yes yes 
      
lnalpha 0.35*** 0.99*** 0.69*** 0.19** 
  (0.11) (0.085) (0.088) (0.084) 
Log Likelihood -1011.7363 -1697.8257 -1608.1583 -1911.7918 
Observations 1376 1376 1376 1376 
Self citations at the inventor level are excluded; levels of significance (probability thresholds) :†<15%, * <10%, 
** <5%, *** <1% 
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Table 6.  
Robustness check: Cox (time to citation) 
COEFFICIENT Model 1 Model 2 
  FPC FPC 
Quality determinants   
    
Professor's experience 0.0100 0.011 
  (0.0075) (0.0087) 
COAS 0.092 0.096 
  (0.082) (0.091) 
Ownership (Ref: University)   
    
Company 0.23*** 0.25** 
  (0.090) (0.11) 
Government -0.35* -0.28 
  (0.20) (0.27) 
Individual 0.027 -0.071 
  (0.38) (0.45) 
BTG -0.0099 0.084 
  (0.24) (0.40) 
NPC -0.29** -0.086 
  (0.14) (0.18) 
SCIENTIFIC QUALITY  0.023** 
   (0.011) 
Control Variables   
    
INV 0.020 0.035 
  (0.024) (0.032) 
CLAIMS 0.010*** 0.0065* 
  (0.0031) (0.0038) 
    
Log Likelihood -1609.997 -1084.4268 
Test of proportional-hazard assumption (p-value) 0.5887 0.0735 
Observations 1332 896 
Self-citations at the inventor level are excluded; levels of significance (probability thresholds) 
:†<15%, * <10%, ** <5%, *** <1% (robust standard errors in parenthesis) 
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Table A1.  
Top applicant by ownership type 
Corporate Patents   
ZENECA 27
CANCER RESEARCH CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY 21
STERIX 19
BP CHEMICALS 16
BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS 16
University Patents   
ISIS INNOVATION 73
UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER  34
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 31
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL 24
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 23
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 23
IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE 22
Government (+ hospitals and + PROs) patents   
MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 32
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE 20
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL 2
ST. GEORGE'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL SCHOOL 2
BTG   
BTG 47
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.  
Technological distribution of academic patent applications 
OST 7 Technological classes   
    
ELECTRONICS 13%
INSTRUMENTS 21%
CHEMISTRY-MATERIALS 17%
PHARMACEUTICALS-BIOTECHNOLOGIES 36%
PROCESS ENGINEERING 4%
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 1%
CONSUMER GOODS-OTHERS 1%
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Table A3.  
Variable and data description 
Name  Description 
    
Dependent 
Variables   
FPC (3) 
Number of forward citations, excluding self-citations at the inventor 
level (citation lag of 3 years considered)  
FPC (6) 
Number of forward citations, excluding self-citations at the inventor 
level (citation lag of 6 years considered)  
    
Quality 
Determinants   
PROFESSOR’ S 
EXPERIENCE  
Number of patents previously applied for by the academic inventor at 
the time of the patent 
COAS Number of co-assignees 
Ownership 
Different dummies which correspond to different patent ownership: 
University, Corporate, Government, Individual and BTG patents are 
considered 
NPC  
Dummy=1 if there is at least one non-patent literature citation in the 
search report 
SCIENTIFIC 
QUALITY 
Average impact factor of the journals of publications sent to the RAE 
2001  
    
Controls   
Year dummies 11 year dummies (1991-2001) 
OST 30 OST technological classification (30 classes) 
INV Number of inventors listed in the patent. 
CLAIMS Number of claims in the patent application. 
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Table A4.  
Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables           
FPC (3) 1376 1.08503 2.11197 0 25
FPC (6) 1376 1.99346 3.25732 0 40
            
Quality Determinants           
PROFESSOR’ S 
EXPERIENCE  1376 3.7689 5.36402 0 29
COAS 1376 1.14608 0.58193 1 13
University 1376 0.39971 0.49002 0 1
Company 1376 0.5 0.50018 0 1
Government 1376 0.0516 0.2213 0 1
Individual 1376 0.01453 0.11972 0 1
BTG 1376 0.03416 0.1817 0 1
NPC  1376 0.119186 0.3241251 0 1
SCIENTIFIC QUALITY* 927 5.09425 4.95312 0 29.567
INV 1376 3.30087 1.74428 1 14
CLAIMS 1376 21.2602 12.9058 0 84
* 1996-2001. 
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Table A5.  
Forward patent citation determinants (granted patents) 
COEFFICIENT Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
  FPC(3) FPC(6) FPC(3) FPC(6) FPC  FPC  FPC  FPC  
          
(University) (Company) (Non-
UK) 
(UK) 
Quality determinants                 
                  
Professor's experience 0.023** 0.020** 0.024* 0.026** 0.024† 0.020 0.0015 0.028***
  0.012 0.0097 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.013 0.01 
COAS 0.098 0.032 -0.094 -0.12 0.18 1.98*** 0,11 -0.038 
  0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.2 0.35 0.13 0.11 
Ownership (Ref: University)                 
                  
Company 0.39*** 0.18* 0.39** 0.096 -5.96*** 4.41*** 0.48*** 0.0056 
  0.13 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.72 0.39 0.15 0.11 
Government 0.028 -0.19 0.034 -0.33 -2.18*** 1.39 0.035 -0.32 
  0.26 0.21 0.37 0.31 0.39 0.43 0.29 0.23 
Individual 0.37 0.31 1.15* 0.86† -18.9 -30.0 0.57 -0.0096 
  0.62 0.48 0.68 0.55 3063 508 0.67 0.49 
BTG 0.14 -0.17 0.39 0.013 -19.7 2.00*** -0.2 -0.22 
  0.36 0.29 0.91 0.77 2124 0.68 0.43 0.3 
NPC -0.36† -0.43** -0.21 -0.28 0.16 -1.04*** -0.23 -0.56*** 
  0.22 0.18 0.31 0.26 0.34 0.3 0.24 0.2 
SCIENTIFIC 
QUALITY     0.051*** 0.049***         
      0.018 0.015         
Control Variables                 
                  
INV 0.038 0.017 0.11*** 0.066* -0.09† -0.003 0.026 0.0038 
  0.036 0.029 0.044 0.037 0.06 0.049 0.039 0.031 
CLAIMS 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.017***
  0.0048 0.004 0.0058 0.005 0.0065 0.0069 0.0052 0.0042 
                  
Constant -0.25 0.83** -1.32** -0.52 -1.13 -2.22*** -0.12 0.37 
  0.33 0.37 0.59 0.49 0.87 0.64 0.49 0.39 
                  
Fields dummy (OST 30) yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Years dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
lnalpha 0.55*** 0.12 0.28** 0.067 0.10 2.41*** 0.55*** 0.051 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) 0.12) (0.15) (0.26) (0.12) (0.1) 
Log Likelihood  -1111.72  -631.48 -1486.92  -825.35 -551.15  -788.94  -920.46  -1198.45  
Observations 756 756 458 458 756 756 756 756 
Self-citations at the inventor level are not considered; levels of significance (probability thresholds) :†<15%, 
* <10%, ** <5%, *** <1% 
 
 
 
